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By Marieke Riethof 
This article examines the mobilisation of human rights in campaigns against hydro-
electric dams in Brazil. The symbolic and legal power of human rights has allowed 
activists to challenge official accounts of the impact of dams while deploying domestic 
and international legal frameworks. Although the politicisation of natural resources in 
Brazil has limited the effectiveness of anti-dam mobilisations, an appeal to the human 
rights agenda has translated into a powerful critique of the social impact of Brazil’s 
development agenda, thereby making a moral and legal claim for justice. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2009 the National Indian Foundation (Fundação Nacional do Índio, FUNAI) reported on 
an expedition to the Amazonian state of Rôndonia where a major dam, the Jirau hydro-
electric complex, was under construction. Detailing evidence of indigenous groups in 
voluntary isolation living close to the dam, the report also found increased deforestation, 
invasions of indigenous territories and cases of previously rare illnesses such as malaria and 
hepatitis. The report added that indigenous groups had fled the region following threats to 
their territory, construction noise and several loud explosions nearby.1 Following on from 
this, in 2011 a labour inspection at the Jirau Dam encountered 38 workers in forced labour 
conditions, a situation exacerbated by health and safety problems and inadequate 
accommodation,2 which in turn provided the impetus behind a large strike that took place at 
the Jirau Dam in early 2012. Frustrated by the conditions they experienced, workers – often 
migrants from other Brazilian states attracted by job prospects at dam construction sites – 
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proceeded to set fire to buses, their lodgings and various communal areas. Reporting from 
helicopters circling around the dam site, television journalists labelled the fires and blockades 
as destruction and vandalism rather than representing the latter as a strategy of resistance that 
had finally forced the construction companies to negotiate.3 During a strike on 6 April 2013 
at the Belo Monte dam, workers also threatened to set their lodgings on fire while attempting 
to unite with other labourers at faraway construction locations, however the police4 managed 
to obstruct their efforts. The government was more concerned about property and dam 
construction than human rights and responded to the strike – as well as regular occupations of 
the building sites by local communities – by employing the authorities to protect the 
construction sites, and in many cases used the latter to repress protests and occupations.  
Dam construction projects have thus become associated with a wide array of human 
rights infringements, from forced labour and violent repression of protests to displacement 
and the destruction of the natural environment and people’s livelihoods. Consequently, since 
the 1980s dam construction sites in Brazil have turned into significant sites of contestation, 
involving protests drawn from local communities, indigenous groups, environmental activists 
and workers.5 Citing the often irreversible impact of hydro-electric dams on communities and 
the environment, these anti-dam campaigners have questioned the social and environmental 
sustainability of Brazil’s ambition to expand hydro-electric power generation. This article 
begins by arguing that the economic, political and symbolic significance of natural resources 
for Latin America has created a politicised situation in which progressive governments have 
promoted the exploitation of natural resources while often ignoring the social and 
environmental costs. The article then turns to discuss the political significance of hydropower 
for Brazil’s national development agenda, which has limited the space for opposing voices to 
be heard, despite Brazil’s legally enshrined commitments to consult and protect affected 
groups. To circumvent these limitations, as the following section explains, anti-dam 
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protestors have deployed a human rights agenda in order to frame socio-environmental 
conflicts in terms of international human rights, thereby highlighting the discrepancies 
between Brazil’s ambitions for global leadership in environmental sustainability and human 
rights, and domestic realities. Finally, two cases of dam conflicts – the Dardanelos and Belo 
Monte dams – illustrate the political dynamic at work in socio-environmental conflicts in 
Brazil. At a domestic level, both conflicts show that anti-dam campaigners have strategically 
mobilised alternative accounts of dams’ effects on local communities, by simultaneously 
challenging official impact studies and widening the definition of the communities and 
territories affected. Both cases underline the significant role of the domestic legal system in 
challenging various aspects of the government decision-making and consultation process. 
However, with the government unresponsive to these demands due to the political and 
economic significance of hydropower, the Belo Monte campaigners have utilised an 
international human rights discourse to exert further pressure on the political process. The 
article concludes that while the international human rights framework has provided activists 
with a powerful political resource to mobilise for procedural rights to consultation and 
information, domestic and international legal strategies have proven to be a double-edged 
sword. The politicisation of natural resources in Brazil has meant that this strategy could not 
resolve substantive problems, such as the irreversible damage to local communities caused by 
dam construction.  
 
The Politicisation of Natural Resources in Latin America 
 
Conflicts about hydro-electric dams cannot be understood without reference to the political 
context in which they take place, as natural resources have become an increasingly 
problematic and politicised source of development. While reliance on natural resources is not 
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a new phenomenon in Latin America, since the early 2000s the economic, political and 
symbolic significance of the sector has deepened at the global, national and local levels. 
David Harvey’s6 concept of accumulation by dispossession suggests how the global 
expansion of capitalism – with the state playing a significant role in this process in Latin 
America – has intensified the commodification of nature and environmental degradation. The 
creation of new development frontiers through the expansion of agriculture, infrastructure, 
and resource extraction in regions such as the Amazon has become associated with the 
dispossession of communities living near mega development projects in terms of their land, 
culture and livelihoods. The contestation of natural resource exploitation has thus become 
inextricably linked with the development agenda pursued by Latin American governments, 
reflecting the political and symbolic significance of natural resources. The politicisation 
process therefore involves both the government discourse about the importance of natural 
resources for national economic and social development and the intensifying contestation 
surrounding the social, political and environmental sustainability of extractivist projects. 
The politicisation of natural resources since the turn of the twenty-first century 
followed a period during which Latin American governments introduced neoliberal policies 
to reduce the role of the state, including political interference in the natural resources sector. 
In the aftermath of the 1982-3 debt crisis and under pressure from global financial 
institutions, governments in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil and 
Mexico decided to privatize key state-owned enterprises, including banks and companies in 
the electricity and natural resources sector. For example, the Brazilian government privatized 
the iron ore mining company Companhia Vale do Rio Doce in 1997, now the country’s 
largest exporter. During the 1980s and 1990s we can therefore speak of the depoliticisation of 
natural resources7 as their exploitation shifted away from the state to the private sector, with a 
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focus on shareholder profits rather than national developmental concerns in an attempt to 
exclude political considerations from shaping the sector’s future.  
Since the late 1990s the Latin American political spectrum has changed significantly 
as voters elected left-wing parties, including in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela. What 
these countries have in common in addition to the electorate’s disillusionment with 
neoliberalism is that their governments have deepened their reliance on primary exports (e.g. 
gas and lithium in Bolivia, iron ore, oil and agriculture in Brazil, and oil in Ecuador and 
Venezuela). Based on the surge in global demand for raw materials and agricultural products 
that lasted until the late 2000s, particularly from China’s booming economy, left-wing 
governments of various political colours and convictions expanded their primary sector. In 
the Brazilian case, the country’s impressive growth rates between 2004 and 2011, was based 
not only on industrial exports but also on the exploitation of natural resources. Although 
Brazil’s economy is more diversified than some of its neighbours, agricultural and primary 
products still play a significant role in the country’s exports. In 2014, 50% of Brazilian 
exports consisted of primary products, most significantly soy (13.26%), iron ore (7.45%) and 
crude oil (6.45%),8 with China, the US and the EU as its principal export markets. In this 
scenario, hydropower has facilitated the expansion of production and the exploitation of 
natural resources as well as driving the increase in domestic energy consumption. 
Predominantly a state-led project under left-wing governments in Latin America, this 
“neo-extractivist” development model has involved using natural resource revenues to 
promote economic and social development.9 This framework has involved both traditional 
extractivist activities, such as mining, and recent concerns such as the production of 
renewable energy and biofuels as well as the regional integration of infrastructure.10 In 
contrast to the neoliberal drive to withdraw the state from the economy, neo-extractivism 
involves a ‘reclaiming’ and rebuilding of state authority in areas such as natural resources and 
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industrial policy with the intention ‘to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and 
approach to social welfare’.11 Due to this political commitment to social development 
through state intervention, ‘the practice of extractivism [has become] associated with an 
imagined national interest’ in which ‘the exploitation of nature serves to secure national 
development and sovereignty, to reduce poverty, increase social participation, to diversify 
local economies and to guarantee political stability’.12 Hence this dynamic has permitted left-
wing governments across the region to argue that the improvement of socio-economic 
conditions through government policies necessitates the expansion of natural resources 
exploitation. 
The renewed political significance of natural resources, however, has signified that 
economic development priorities often override other concerns, such as democratic 
participation in decision-making, human rights and environmental protection. In 
Hogenboom’s view, the ‘repoliticisation’ of extractivism has meant that progressive regimes 
‘prefer to keep [natural resource extraction] a highly centralized field of governance and to 
pose strict limits to local demands from civil society’.13 For Eduardo Gudynas, the region’s 
progressive reliance on natural resources does not resolve structural inequalities but merely 
compensates for the negative effects of the commodification of nature,14 while 
simultaneously politically marginalising groups directly affected by this process, particularly 
indigenous people.15 In Gudynas’ view, the strategic importance of natural resources has also 
resulted in Latin American governments engaging with environmental issues ‘at a surface 
level’, leading to an environmental agenda ‘that effectively incorporates actions that are 
functional to economic growth and a relationship to the global economy that relies on the 
export of primary commodities’.16 Development strategies based on the commodification of 
nature have also become an object of intense contestation. According to Svampa, the Latin 
American ‘commodities consensus’ has led to an ‘eco-territorial’ turn in which a wide variety 
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of socio-environmental activists have argued that natural resources, such as land, water, 
forests, should not be considered as strategic resources to be commodified for development 
but as part of the natural, social and cultural heritage of humankind.17  
Because of these contradictions, the politicisation of natural resources in Latin 
America has generated two clashing discourses: one argument – usually presented by the 
region’s progressive governments – is that millions of ordinary citizens can benefit from the 
exploitation of natural resources that underpins an expansionist economic and social 
development agenda. The ‘developmental illusion’18 among Latin American governments 
reflects the view that trade in natural resources opens up opportunities to produce social and 
economic development, while escaping the fluctuations in global demand for primary goods. 
The other argument of those opposed to unfettered natural resource exploitation points to the 
uneven distribution of the costs and benefits and the denial of space for differing views to 
contest this development strategy. The affected communities have viewed the exploitation of 
natural resources as creating irreversible damage, which is relevant not only locally but also 
nationally and globally, as their views increasingly resonate with transnational environmental 
activists and global concerns about the state of Latin America’s natural environment.  
 
Renewable Energy as a Source of Conflict in Brazil 
 
In the debate about the politicisation of natural resources, hydro-electric dams are a 
particularly poignant case because they not only produce two-thirds of Brazil’s electricity and 
generate renewable energy – a cornerstone of climate change policy – but they also cause 
irreversible social and ecological damage according to the dams’ opponents. In effect, the 
government argument pitches the interest of millions of Brazilians in national progress and 
poverty reduction against a supposedly localised discourse about the rights and specific 
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interests of those directly affected by extractivist projects. However, local communities, 
together with a transnational network of activists, have offered a different conception of 
sustainability, one focused on maintaining indigenous peoples’ distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their land as connected with a responsibility for the protection of nature.19 
Nevertheless, as the discourses used in conflicts about hydro-electric dams in Brazil illustrate, 
the politicised nature of natural resources as a highly strategic sector has simultaneously 
constrained opposition and opened up new domestic and international spaces for 
contestation.20 
The expansion of infrastructure and hydro-electric power generation in the Amazon 
region21 has formed a cornerstone of Brazil’s development agenda since the 1980s. 
Accelerating in the 2000s in response to electricity blackouts and growing demand, the dual 
objective of this expansion has been to decrease the country’s dependence on energy imports 
and to increase renewable energy sources for domestic consumption. To illustrate the 
importance of renewable energy, in 2014 a total of 83.7% of Brazilian electricity was 
generated from renewable sources, including 67.6% from hydropower. In 2014, dams located 
in the northern Brazilian states generated 14% of this electricity and the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy expects this proportion to increase to 23% by 2024 to cope with growing 
consumer and industrial demand. Combined, the highly controversial Belo Monte and São 
Luiz do Tapajós dam complexes in the Amazonian state of Pará represent 68% of the planned 
expansion of hydropower over the next decade.22 The government’s argument concerning 
dams has focused on the essential role of hydro-electricity in national development, which in 
turn is expected to lead to improved Brazilian living standards. For example, in response to 
questions about indigenous rights during Brazil’s Universal Periodic Review at the Human 
Rights Council in 2012, the Brazilian representative pointed out that the country’s 
‘development projects contribute not only to economic growth, but also the creation of clean 
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energy, which accounts for a large part of the country’s supply. Moreover, infrastructure 
creates regional and local benefits’.23 From this perspective, hydro-electric power not only 
underpins national and regional development but as a renewable source of energy also 
contributes to Brazil’s strategy to champion climate change policy.24 
Anti-dam campaigners have challenged the government argument about the benefits 
of hydro-electric dams, emphasising the costs in social, cultural and environmental terms. 
Based on site visits to, and testimonies from, communities affected by dams in the 2000s, a 
2010 Brazilian government report25 detailed the human rights violations associated with dam 
construction. In addition to population displacement due to flooding, the report signalled that 
local communities experienced changes in traditional land use including: pollution; territorial 
conflicts and invasions or damage to protected areas; the loss of sacred sites; a deterioration 
in their quality of life; health problems; threats of violence; actual violence; and food 
insecurity, such as the loss of fisheries.26 Compounding these negative effects, the 
Amazonian region, where most dam projects are concentrated, dominates the statistics of 
killings, threats and arrests of protestors associated with environmental conflicts.27 By 
emphasising the tensions between these human rights violations, the national development 
and environmental agendas as a strategic focus, the human rights framework has provided 
access to domestic and international legal instruments to challenge government policy. 
Human Rights in Socio-Environmental Conflicts 
 
While environmental human rights are hard to define,28 framing environmental problems in 
terms of human rights has allowed socio-environmental activists to appeal to internationally 
recognised procedural and substantive rights, particularly when struggles involve indigenous 
peoples. Apart from the core international human rights declarations,29 specific principles 
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relevant to the rights of indigenous people can be found in the International Labour 
Organization’s Convention 169 on indigenous rights and the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Both ILO Convention 169, ratified by Brazil in 
2002, and UNDRIP outline indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination (respectively, in 
the Preamble and in Article 3) and cultural integrity (in Article 5 of ILO 169 and in Articles 
8, 11-13, 31 of UNDRIP). Another significant element of the Convention and UNDRIP is 
that ‘indigenous peoples bear both substantive and procedural land and resource rights’.30 
From this perspective, substantive rights include the legal recognition of territories and 
indigenous peoples’ right to use this land as well as its resources. Procedural rights include 
the right to participation and consultation, particularly the principle of free, prior and 
informed consultation when development projects affected indigenous livelihoods. The ILO 
Convention 169 (Article 4) stipulates that governments should adopt special measures to 
protect indigenous groups, underlining the importance of the procedural principles of 
consultation and participation. However, in practice the extent to which these rights are 
recognised and upheld has depended on the national political context, where indigenous 
groups’ views and interests have often been marginalised or excluded from the debate. 
A human rights perspective highlights the unequal way in which people experience 
the impact of environmental problems, which has often translated into uneven domestic 
access to consultation and the legal protection of vulnerable groups.31 These inequalities are 
mutually reinforcing, as the effects of environmental problems caused by natural resource 
exploitation tend to be more severe when local communities’ livelihoods rely on land and 
water resources and when these communities have cultural and religious connections to the 
local environment, as in the case of indigenous communities.32 These communities often lack 
the resources to cope with environmental damage or the capacity to pressurise their 
government for protection, as in the case of Brazil.  
11 
 
Even though the Brazilian regulatory structure provides for consultation and 
participation in the licensing of dam projects,33 the consultation process has transformed into 
a struggle about the recognition of the rights of those affected by dams.34 As Hochstetler 
argues, the environmental licensing process in Brazil is a significant source of contention 
because the process is open to public participation, and includes social as well as 
environmental considerations.35 However, the extent to which the consultation process can 
effectively address substantive concerns is questionable. At a hearing about human rights 
violations in the Belo Monte case in 2011, a participant observed: ‘Whoever went to the 
government hearings did not get a response to their questions. In addition, they organised 
hearings at the last minute so that we could not participate. We are not being heard by the 
companies and the government. They come, throw a book detailing the phases of the works 
on our table or push it under our door, and they say that this is a dialogue’.36 In the case of the 
São Luiz do Tapajós Dam, in Fearnside’s view the environmental licensing process ‘ignores 
many serious socioeconomic impacts and minimises others’, concluding that they are merely 
a figleaf to justify decisions that have already been made.37 Similarly, Zhouri points out that 
Brazil’s licensing procedures, while ostensibly promoting participation, have effectively 
depoliticised the consultation process by limiting the right to object to large development 
projects.38 As the Brazilian situation shows, no matter how important procedural rights are 
for vulnerable groups,39 procedures are not always effective and they do not always help to 
protect substantive rights or compensate for losses,40 which has further intensified socio-
environmental conflicts. While effective opposition through participation in decision-making 
processes has become limited, activists have turned to the international human rights 
framework to challenge the domestic consultation and mitigation procedures. 
Reflecting the potential of the human rights framework to address these inequalities, 
the legal mobilization framework posits that the primary strength of a human rights appeal 
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not only lies in access to legal instruments but also in the power of human rights claims to be 
a political resource with the potential for political mobilisation and change. 41 However, the 
mere existence of laws and regulations have not necessarily guaranteed satisfactory 
outcomes, as the Brazilian case illustrates. Legal frameworks are therefore a double-edged 
sword as the ‘law often significantly supports prevailing social relations as well as provides 
limited resources for challenging those relationships’.42 As Burdon warns, while 
environmental human rights can provide protection, ‘they have not been designed to address 
the underlying root causes of environmental harm’.43 For Adelman, the ‘key lies in 
translating human rights as aspirations or moral claims into enforceable demands’,44 which is 
often a difficult task. According to McCann, although the ‘law provides both normative 
principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social struggles’,45 the strategic use of 
the law as a political resource needs be accompanied by political mobilisation strategies to 
put pressure on the political process, such as demonstrations, lobbying, transnational 
networking, occupations and strikes.  
As discussed in the next section, the opponents of dam projects have used a range of 
mobilisation strategies but because they have viewed the domestic consultation procedures as 
lacking, they have appealed to internationally agreed human rights such as the right to 
information, participation and consultation, and access to justice mechanisms. As a result, 
international institutions46 such as the Organization of American States (OAS)47 and the 
United Nations human rights framework have increasingly become a focal point for socio-
environmental campaigners in Brazil. The inter-American human rights framework not only 
recognises the distinctive position of indigenous peoples but has also established the 
relationship between environmental problems and human rights, which opens up the 
procedures to non-indigenous groups affected by development projects: ‘where 
environmental degradation is not managed and minimized, it can threaten living conditions 
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and even life itself’, which means that ‘human life is threatened just as human lives can be 
threatened by torture, imprisonment, and forced labor’.48 The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) can recommend precautionary measures, which has taken place in 
response to several Brazilian cases of social-environmental conflicts, notably the Belo Monte 
Dam but also when the state failed to protect indigenous groups whose territories had not yet 
been recognised.49 Upholding procedural rights can also function to enhance democratic 
accountability from the OAS viewpoint, as ‘governments strengthen their democratic base at 
the same time that they promote sustainability’,50 which has the potential to bridge the gap 
between the generalised benefits of extractivism and socio-environmental costs. The 
intersection between environmental sustainability and human rights in this definition has 
been interpreted in the inter-American system as the positive obligation of governments to 
address environmental damage and to protect indigenous territories,51 which is reflected in 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling on the Belo Monte Dam in 2011. However, 
as the next section argues, the outcome of socio-environmental struggles – even when 
international human rights are mobilised – continues to depend on political dynamics as 
signified by the symbolic politics of natural resources. 
Contesting Dams: Human Rights Discourses in Socio-Environmental Conflicts in 
Brazil 
 
The campaigns against the Dardanelos and Belo Monte Dams in Brazilian Amazonia 
illustrate how anti-dam activists have mobilised the power of human rights discourses to 
challenge the ethical, legal and political dimensions of the government’s development 
agenda. In the case of the Dardanelos Dam, the project faced particularly strong opposition 
from local indigenous communities who struggled for any recognition of the effects of the 
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dam on their livelihoods. However, when the Dardanelos Dam began operating in 2011, it 
soon became clear that the drive to expand hydro-electric power would override these 
concerns. In the Belo Monte Dam case, activists therefore mobilised the symbolic and legal 
power of human rights by drawing international attention to Brazil’s human rights record and 
bringing the case to international bodies such as the IACHR and HRC. As the Belo Monte 
Dam became an international emblem of the anti-dam movement, the symbolic power of the 
human rights agenda pointed to the human cost of natural resource exploitation, which in turn 
allowed activists to frame the resultant damage in terms of nationally- and internationally-
defined rights. At Rio+20, connecting the international human rights and environmental 
sustainability agendas to hydro-electric dams meant that socio-environmental campaigners 
could challenge the government’s development agenda which, while not halting dam 
construction, resulted in long delays in the dam construction process. 
 
Domestic Contestation of the Dardanelos Dam 
 
The Dardanelos hydro-electric dam in the municipality of Aripuanã in the north of Mato 
Grosso state was one of the first government-funded dam projects in the 2000s. Although 
the project received less attention compared to high-profile cases such as Belo Monte and 
Jirau, the controversies surrounding its construction are emblematic for other socio-
environmental conflicts. Construction commenced in 2007 in the midst of lengthy legal and 
political battles that had started two years previously, exemplifying not only the problems 
associated with dams but also the challenges raised by opponents. Before construction began, 
government authorities stated that the dam would only affect indigenous territories in the 
region indirectly because of its location outside indigenous land.52 Because of irregularities 
and omissions in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA),53 the state’s public prosecutor 
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initiated legal action against a number of companies involved in the dam’s construction in 
2005, demanding the cancellation of the EIA54 and suspending the project tender.55 The 
prosecutor criticised the EIA for not consulting the State Environmental Council, for not 
including the impact outside the municipality, and ignoring alternative locations. Neither did 
the assessment take into account electricity transmission to the national grid, which would 
cause damage over a larger area than predicted.56 Furthermore, a 2004 report on local 
indigenous communities signalled the threat of migrants to the region in search of 
construction jobs, which would increase illegal fishing, hunting and logging, as well as 
polluting the natural environment.57 The Dardanelos case therefore signals the significant role 
of regional public prosecutors who have challenged various aspects of the licensing and 
construction process, demonstrating the key role of the Brazilian legal system in the 
opposition to dams.  
After the initial suspension of the project tender, the local public prosecutors 
continued to challenge the project, including the construction of electricity transmission lines, 
all based on irreversible social and environmental damage.58 Despite claims that indigenous 
communities would not be affected, the construction process directly threatened indigenous 
sacred and ancestral sites, as in 2010 when the Aguas da Pedra construction company blew 
up an indigenous cemetery.59 In response, around 400 indigenous activists occupied the 
construction site in 2010, holding construction workers hostage to demand compensation for 
their losses, but the damage was irreversible.60 Similar to the other Amazonian dams,61 
opponents also questioned official information about the economic viability of the dam, 
particularly the effect of seasonally fluctuating water levels, raising concerns about the dam’s 
productivity during the dry season. The Dardanelos case illustrates that opposition strategies 
focused on the Brazilian legal system in a struggle to challenge the narrow definition of the 
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dam’s impact but also that national legal provisions were insufficient to safeguard the rights 
of the groups involved.  
 
The Belo Monte Dam on the International Stage 
 
While the Dardanelos conflict received some international attention, the protests’ dynamics 
were primarily domestic. Instead, the Belo Monte Dam has become an international symbol 
of the resistance of indigenous people to the damage caused by hydro-electric dams, 
illustrating how campaigners used symbolic and legal strategies to challenge the project. 
Planning for the Belo Monte dam began under the military government in the mid-1970s but 
accelerated in the 1990s, until Congress and the Senate finally approved the dam in July 2005 
However, questions of transparency, legality and the consultation of indigenous groups 
continued to spark controversy,62 eventually leading to legal challenges conducted through 
international human rights institutions.  
Although an exhaustive overview of the legal issues surrounding the Belo Monte Dam 
is beyond the scope of this article,63 the complexities of the legal process explain why 
activists have appealed to international legal frameworks to contest the dam. At a national 
level protests have focused on the government’s attempts to simplify the process of 
environmental licensing and, as in the Dardanelos case, protestors also challenged the impact 
studies conducted. Their argument focused on the gap between the right to consultation and 
the political reality, which effectively limited this right. The anti-dam coalition disputed the 
official EIA in 2009, pointing out omissions and irregularities. Challenging the official 
accounts of the impact of dams on local communities therefore turned into a key strategy to 
halt construction. The 230 page alternative report argued that the EIA underestimated the 
number of people and land area affected by the dam, overstated the project’s environmental 
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sustainability and lacked appropriate mitigation mechanisms.64 The dam would lead to 
extensive flooding of towns and villages in Pará state, as well as drying up of parts of the 
Xingu River. At the same time, the dam offered few real benefits to local communities as the 
energy generated locally would need to be transported to the national grid, supporting 
wealthier parts of the country. While the dam displaced approximately 35,000 people during 
and after construction,65 Brazilian government reports indicated that the Belo Monte Dam 
would facilitate the construction of additional dams further upstream, with significant 
potential for additional displacement.66 The alternative report also contested the often-cited 
argument that the actual infrastructure would not be located on indigenous land so 
consultation of indigenous people was not required. The official EIA had excluded rivers and 
shores from indigenous territories, which would significantly alter the potential effects.67 
Following these debates, in April 2010 a federal judge in Pará suspended the project tender, 
citing a lack of consultation of indigenous people, which is unconstitutional according to 
Article 231. The president of the state’s Regional Federal Tribunal overturned this decision 
on the same day, arguing that there was no immediate danger to indigenous people because 
construction would not start immediately.68 
To address the difficulties of proceeding through the domestic legal system and the 
lack of effective consultation, a coalition of groups from the Xingu River Basin issued a 
complaint with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in 2011, which became 
one of the most controversial international legal challenges to Brazil’s development agenda. 
The Court’s ruling in April 2011 recommended precautionary measures, calling for the 
Brazilian government to halt construction until indigenous people were properly consulted 
and appropriate measures to guarantee the protection of their livelihood were tabled. The 
recommended precautionary measures involved measures to protect the life and integrity of 
indigenous communities affected by the dam while suspending the licensing and construction 
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process. The ruling stipulated that these measures reflected Brazil’s international obligations 
and recommended translating the EIA into indigenous languages as well as developing a plan 
for the protection of peoples in voluntary isolation.69  
Although the ruling strengthened the recognition of the rights of those affected by 
Belo Monte and the legitimacy of their claims in terms of Brazil’s international human rights 
obligations, the recommendations met with a sharp response from the Brazilian government, 
indicating sensitivity to international pressure despite government resistance. The Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs responded ‘with perplexity’ to the demands of indigenous communities 
‘supposedly threatened’ by the construction of Belo Monte.70 The Brazilian government 
subsequently withdrew its ambassador to the OAS as well as suspending its financial 
contribution of US$800,000 to the IACHR. The government also responded with a 52 page 
document, questioning the scope of the Court’s powers over domestic matters and arguing 
that the government had taken appropriate measures to consult and protect indigenous 
people.71 The government refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the IACHR in this matter, 
arguing that its role was subsidiary and that the consultation of indigenous people was an 
exclusively domestic concern as guaranteed by Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution.72 
The document spent much time outlining indigenous policies in Brazil with little detail 
provided about the actual effects of Belo Monte. Tellingly, the response defined electricity as 
essential for fundamental development goals, such as to ‘promote human dignity, guarantee 
national development, eradicate extreme poverty and marginalisation, and to reduce social 
and regional inequalities’.73 Under pressure from Brazil, the IACHR issued a heavily toned 
down and revised ruling in July 2011, focusing on the protection of the health and cultural 
integrity of indigenous peoples as well as recommending measures to mitigate the impacts of 
Belo Monte.74 Before the ruling was revised, the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), in charge of monitoring the environmental impact 
19 
 
of energy projects, had already issued a license authorising construction to begin in June 
2011.75 The Brazilian response to international pressure to uphold its human rights 
commitments illustrates the political power of the government’s counter-argument, which 
ended up overriding human rights concerns. However, the strong Brazilian reaction to the 
ruling also signals the political and symbolic significance of the international recognition of 
the rights of the communities involved, lending legitimacy to and recognition of 
campaigners’ demands.  
Following the IACHR ruling, in March 2012 the International Labour Organization 
called on the Brazilian government to observe Convention 169, requiring the consultation and 
participation of indigenous people regarding issues that affect their livelihoods. The tripartite 
commission noted that while the hydro-electric dams may not be located on indigenous lands, 
the former could alter ‘the navigability of rivers, flora and fauna and climate, [going] further 
than the flooding of lands or the displacement of the peoples concerned’.76 The legal battles 
also continued in Brazil. In 2012 the Brazilian Regional Federal Court halted construction of 
the Belo Monte Dam,77 which the Federal Supreme Court overturned again in August of the 
same year, after which construction resumed immediately.78 While the construction process 
advanced, the Belo Monte activists decided to use the occasion of the Rio+20 sustainable 
development summit in June 2012 to emphasise the discrepancies between Brazil’s 
international environmental credentials and the government’s domestic development agenda. 
In an example of mobilising symbolic political discourse,79 the campaigners challenged 
Brazil’s international reputation while the case also illustrates the limitations of a human 
rights strategy in a restrictive political context. 
 
Symbolic Politics at Rio+20 
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The Rio+20 sustainable development conference in June 2012 provided the anti-dam 
campaigners with a platform to focus their protests on Brazil’s international reputation as a 
champion of sustainable development. The Xingu Vivo movement organised a parallel 
meeting close to the Belo Monte Dam in Altamira, called ‘Xingu+23’ to mark twenty years 
since the first ‘Encounter of the Indigenous People of Xingu’, which took place in 1989. On 
16 June 2012, anti-dam activists occupied a temporary dam near Santo Antonio and opened a 
small channel to allow the Xingu river to flow. They also formed the words ‘Pare Belo 
Monte’ (Stop Belo Monte) on the dam, captured on an aerial photograph.80 Another “human 
banner” on the beach in Rio de Janeiro read ‘Rios para a vida’ (Rivers for Life).81 Anti-dam 
groups featuring Brazilian and international participants held several meetings in the civil 
society arena in Aterro do Flamengo, located about 30 kilometres from the official 
conference in Riocentro. However, while Rio+20 should have underlined Brazil’s global 
leadership ambitions as South America’s largest democracy, the spatial organisation of the 
conference also served to illustrate the distance between civil society and the official 
negotiators.82 
With the eyes of the world on Brazil, the anti-dam activists also protested against the 
Belo Monte Dam in Rio de Janeiro. On 18 June 2012, about 1,000 indigenous protesters 
marched from the People’s Summit in Flamengo along some of the city’s busiest roads to the 
headquarters of Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES).83 In a sign of crossover 
between legal and political mobilisation strategies, some of the protesters held signs 
proclaiming that the Brazilian government should respect ILO Convention 169. They 
protested against the Bank’s role in financing large infrastructural projects, wearing ‘typical 
clothes, bodies painted, holding tacapes [indigenous weapons], bows and arrows’.84 A couple 
of days later, on the first day of the official Rio+20 conference, around 2,000 activists 
gathered outside the Riocentro conference centre. Led by the Kayapó leader Cacique Raoni, 
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the protesters wanted to present a document detailing indigenous demands to UN Secretary-
General Ban-ki Moon.85 They eventually talked to Gilberto Carvalho, President Dilma 
Rousseff’s chief of staff, who allowed a small delegation to enter the official conference the 
next day.86 Although the delegation met again with Carvalho at Riocentro, who conceded that 
there had been a lack of advance consultation in the case of Belo Monte, the delegation’s 
presence at the official negotiations unsurprisingly did not result in the government 
suspending construction,87 yet by recognising the Brazilian government’s sensitivity to 
negative international publicity in the area of human rights and the environment, the activists 
very consciously engaged in symbolic politics to draw attention to their struggle.  
With Brazil’s environmental credentials at stake, the anti-dam protesters used the 
momentum of Rio+20 to highlight the tensions between human rights and development 
policy while Brazil was in the international spotlight, providing them with symbolic leverage 
in their attempt to hold the Brazilian state accountable. The Dardanelos and Belo Monte case 
studies illustrate the significance of combining political mobilisation with legal strategies in 
an attempt to force the Brazilian government to recognise the problems caused by dams. The 
campaigns also underline the power of the national developmental discourse, which 
continued to restrict the debate about procedural and substantive issues associated with large 
development projects. The internationally-focused human rights strategy developed by the 
campaigners did affect the government’s concerns about Brazil’s international reputation, 
particularly when campaigners exploited the political opportunity of Rio+20 and as illustrated 
by the government’s reaction to the IACHR ruling about Belo Monte. While Brazilian dam 
conflicts are ongoing, the outcomes suggest that international human rights strategies, while 
unable to halt dam construction or resolve substantive problems, can be employed effectively 
to exert political pressure in a polarised context.  
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Conclusion 
 
Weeks before the climate talks began in Paris in November 2015, Brazil experienced one of 
the most severe environmental disasters in the country’s recent history. In the state of Minas 
Gerais, a mining dam being used to hold waste from iron ore extraction collapsed, releasing a 
torrent of toxic mud which swallowed the small town of Bento Rodrigues, killing 12 people 
with about a dozen further victims still missing. The disaster’s human and environmental 
damage once again underlines the cost of natural resource exploitation while the same time 
iron ore continues to be one of Brazil’s most important export products. In the same month, 
and only days before the Paris talks started, the Brazilian environmental agency IBAMA 
granted the license necessary to start filling the reservoirs of the Belo Monte Dam, despite a 
letter FUNAI indicating that many social and environmental conditions had not been met.88 
These examples illustrate the relationship between development, environmental and human 
rights priorities, where the dominant discourse about the necessity of natural resources for 
national development has created a highly politicised environment. The cases discussed in 
this article also highlight the intensity of socio-environmental conflicts in Brazil in a context 
where the politicisation of energy leaves little space for effective domestic opposition, 
contributing to the decision to appeal to the international human rights discourse. 
An analysis of socio-environmental conflicts in terms of human rights illuminates 
how campaigners have translated the human rights agenda into a powerful moral and political 
critique of development projects, supported by a wide range of other protest strategies. At the 
same time, the legal mobilisation approach highlights the limitations of international human 
rights strategies to pursue political change. Legal strategies are a double-edged sword: 
domestically, while the Brazilian legal system and the environmental licensing process have 
opened up opportunities for contestation, the national political dynamic has prevented the 
23 
 
extension of the right to consultation to the right to object to dams. While international 
rulings in favour of campaigners can strengthen the legitimacy of their claims and the 
recognition of their rights, enforcement depends on a government’s willingness to recognise 
these decisions. As the Brazilian case demonstrates, when an issue is as politicised and 
significant as energy policy, human rights norms also become politicised, thus the 
incorporation of these norms into national legislation and practice is by no means a linear or 
straightforward process.  
 Consequently, the political dynamic in Brazil illustrates the problematic relationship 
between procedural and substantive human rights in socio-environmental conflicts. Legal 
challenges have focused on procedural rights, particularly the right to prior consultation, 
which has turned into a struggle about whose costs and benefits are important when 
considering the impact of dams. The dam campaigners’ critique has involved a struggle to 
recognise both the procedural and substantive rights of those involved in socio-environmental 
conflicts, as the official definition of the dams’ impact often proved to be exceedingly 
narrow. The Brazilian experience also demonstrates that these procedures have often proved 
to be lacking, not only because of the narrow definition of the costs and benefits but also 
because dam construction often proceeded while the conditions set out in official impact 
studies had not yet been fulfilled. Furthermore, the procedural framework did not necessarily 
resolve substantive issues about the livelihoods of local communities and inequalities in 
terms of how people experience dams’ effects. While appropriate procedures are essential 
because they offer access to information, consultation and potentially justice, to marginalised 
groups they do not always answer more fundamental questions about the human rights 
implications of irreversible damage to people’s livelihoods. 
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